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INTRODUCTION 
A prominent law dean is forced to resign over an alleged sexual affair 
with a student; a writing instructor details in a national magazine his 
steamy affair with his married student; a student stalks her male professor 
after he ends their sexual relationship, and the criminal stalking charges 
against her are only dropped when she agrees voluntarily to leave the 
country.1  Increasingly, such tantalizing scandals are making their way into 
the nation’s daily consciousness.  Yet, behind all of these shocking tales of 
decadence lies the very real dilemma as to how college and university 
administrators should regulate consensual relationships between faculty 
members and students. 
Although numerous scholars have posited various approaches to these 
seemingly intractable matters of the heart,2 none of these commentators 
have adequately balanced the bewildering array of overlapping faculty, 
1. See Sara Rimer, Love on Campus: Trying to Set Rules for the Emotions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 2003, at B8 (reporting sexual harassment allegation by former law student against 
University of California-Berkeley’s law school dean John Dwyer and his subsequent 
resignation); Liz Sidoti, Clamping Down on Campus Liaisons; To Avoid Messy Litigation, 
More Colleges Overtly Ban Faculty-Student Dating, WASH. POST, May 12, 2002, at A11 
(discussing stalking incident at Ohio Wesleyan University and GQ magazine article 
describing faculty-student affair at the College of William and Mary); Rebecca Trounson, 
UC Bans Dating of Faculty, Students; Professors Are Barred from Having Affairs with 
Those They Teach or Are Likely to Teach, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2003, at B1 (reporting 
sexual harassment allegation by former law student against University of California-
Berkeley’s law school dean). 
2. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Romantic Relationships between Professors and their 
Students: Morality, Ethics and Law, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 493 (2001); Martha Chamallas, 
Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988); 
Gary E. Elliott, Consensual Relationships and the Constitution: A Case of Liberty Denied, 6 
MICH. J. GENDER  & L. 47 (1999); Caroline Forell, What’s Wrong with Faculty-Student Sex? 
The Law School Context, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1997); Neal Hutchens, The Legal Effect of 
College and University Policies Prohibiting Romantic Relationships between Students and 
Professors, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 411 (2003); Margaret H. Mack, Regulating Sexual 
Relationships between Faculty and Students, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 79 (1999); Carol 
Sanger, The Erotics of Torts, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1852 (1998) (reviewing JANE GALLOP, 
FEMINIST ACCUSED OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1997)); Jerome W.D. Stokes & D. Frank 
Vinik, Consensual Sexual Relations between Faculty and Students in Higher Education, 96 
ED. L. REP. 899 (1995); Sherry Young, Getting to Yes: The Case Against Banning 
Consensual Relationships in Higher Education, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 269 
(1996). 
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student, university, and third-party interests.  Furthermore, current faculty-
student consensual relationship policies are either underinclusive in not 
providing a sufficient institutional response to troubling faculty conduct, or 
overinclusive in ignoring the very real privacy and associational interests 
that individuals have in forming private intimate associations away from 
the workplace.3
As someone who teaches labor and employment law and education 
law, and who comes from a labor and employment law practice 
background, I approach the regulation of faculty-student consensual 
relationships from a distinctive viewpoint.  Rather than focusing on highly 
indeterminate and politically charged concepts such as consent and power, 
as most scholars and postsecondary institutions do,4 my approach examines 
the more easily discernible impact or effect that consensual relationships 
have on the college and university environment.  The premise underlying 
this approach is that a college or university may only legitimately regulate 
the private affairs of its employees5 if such private conduct spills over into 
the academic arena and adversely affects the college or university by 
damaging the school’s reputation, by interfering with a professor’s ability 
to properly perform his or her job, or by causing other faculty members and 
students not to want to work with the offending professor. 
While this approach to consensual relationships is new in the college 
and university context, the idea of regulating these relationships based upon 
their impact on the surrounding workplace environment is not.  In fact, 
there already exists an extensive body of labor arbitration case law 
concerning the regulation of employee off-duty conduct.  For over a half a 
century, labor arbitrators in the union context have applied the so-called 
“nexus principle” to determine whether an employer could properly 
discipline or discharge an employee for private conduct away from the 
workplace, on the employee’s own time.6  In such cases, arbitrators have 
consistently held that an employer has no business interfering with the 
private lives of its employees unless such conduct adversely affects the 
employer’s business interests in some relevant manner.7
3. The various approaches taken by colleges and universities to faculty-student 
consensual relationships are examined in detail below.  See infra Part I. 
4. See Forell, supra note 2, at 50, 68; see also Mack, supra note 2, at 86. 
5. The other party to such consensual relationships, the student, is generally not subject 
to the same regulations as faculty.  See Sidoti, supra note 1, at A11.  The reason that 
professors take the brunt of the consequences stemming from such consensual relationships 
is because they are considered the empowered party who can more easily choose to avoid 
such relationships.  See Mack, supra note 2, at 89. 
6. See infra Part II.B. 
7. See infra Part II.B. 
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By applying this nexus principle to the college and university 
environment, a number of guideposts emerge as to how postsecondary 
institutions should treat faculty-student consensual relationships.  First, a 
blanket rule either permitting or prohibiting all consensual faculty-student 
relationships is not appropriate, as the facts of individual cases will 
determine whether the private sexual conduct of the faculty member has a 
detrimental impact on the college or university.  Second, although a general 
rule would appear not to be possible, useful presumptions can nevertheless 
be established.  Where the faculty member is involved in a consensual 
relationship with a student, whom he or she is supervising or evaluating, 
the presumption is that a private relationship in these circumstances is 
likely to adversely affect the college or university environment in some 
fashion, unless the faculty member can establish that the relationship in 
question in fact caused a negligible detrimental impact to the college or 
university.  On the other hand, where no such supervisory or evaluative 
relationship exists, the opposite presumption applies unless the college or 
university can establish that specific facts exist suggesting that such private 
conduct is directly interfering with the academic setting.  In a nutshell, the 
nexus test supports a sliding scale approach to consensual relationships 
between a faculty member and a student. 
In Part I of this article, I set out the current approaches taken by 
postsecondary institutions to faculty-student consensual relationships, 
explore the reasons animating such approaches, and detail the chief 
criticisms of such approaches.  In Part II, after first reviewing the basics of 
labor arbitration law, I examine the nexus principle and consider its 
application by labor arbitrators to specific instances of employee private 
consensual sexual conduct.  Having discussed the intricacies of the nexus 
principle, Part III discusses whether it is appropriate to apply this principle 
to faculty-student consensual relationships in the college and university 
setting.  Concluding that the nexus principle does appropriately apply to 
faculty-student consensual relationships, Part IV recommends that colleges 
and universities adopt a sliding scale approach to faculty-student 
consensual relationships. 
I.  CURRENT APPROACHES TO FACULTY-STUDENT CONSENSUAL 
RELATIONSHIPS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
In adopting faculty-student consensual relationship policies, colleges 
and universities have generally utilized one of four approaches, spanning 
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the spectrum from least restrictive of faculty and student freedom to engage 
in consensual relationships to most restrictive.8
A.  The Laissez-Faire Approach to Consensual Relationships 
The least restrictive approach to faculty-student consensual 
relationships is the approach taken by those schools that have not adopted 
any direct prohibitions on such consensual relationships.9  This approach is 
most consistent with the liberal view that a governmental agency has no 
business interfering with the private, legal activities of consenting adults.10  
If consent were absent in a faculty-student relationship, a proponent of this 
type of approach would argue that a student always has the ability to utilize 
sexual harassment law for relief.11
Indeed, almost all colleges and universities now have in place some 
form of sexual harassment policy that regulates relations between faculty 
and students.12  Such policies spring from Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972,13 which generally proscribes sexual discrimination, 
including sexually harassing behavior, in federally funded educational 
programs or activities.14  Proponents of the sexual harassment approach to 
faculty-student consensual relationships maintain that if sexual harassment 
policies are good enough for the general workplace, there is no reason that 
such policies should not be adequate for the college or university 
environment.15
8. But cf. Mack, supra note 2, at 87 (employing an alternative method of categorization 
of consensual relationship policies). 
9. Professor Young reports that most academic institutions (at least as of 1996) do not 
have formal restrictions on consensual relationships.  See Young, supra note 2, at 272 n.17 
(citing Peter DeChiara, The Need for Universities to Have Rules on Consensual Sexual 
Relationships Between Faculty Members and Students, 21 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 137, 
138 (1988)).  As this proposition is based on an article that depended on an empirical study 
from 1987, it is unclear, absent more recent study, whether most schools now have some 
formal restrictions on consensual relationships in place.  However, given the publicity 
devoted to these types of relationships in recent years by newspapers, legal commentators 
and academic organizations like the American Association of University Professors and the 
American Association of Law Schools, the number of schools adopting consensual 
relationship policies has no doubt increased substantially since 1987. 
10. See Elliott, supra note 2, at 77 (maintaining that “[t]he sexual lives of consenting 
adults, absent a violation of law, are not the business of the academy.”); see also Chamallas, 
supra note 2, at 841 (describing the liberal view concerning private sexual relations). 
11. See Elliott, supra note 2, at 51-52. 
12. See Young, supra note 2, at 278. 
13. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000). 
14. Id. § 1681(a); see generally Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students 
by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (Mar. 13, 
1997). 
15. See Dan Subotnik, What’s Wrong With Faculty-Student Sex?: Response II, 47 J. 
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Although consensual relationships should generally not be subject to 
Title IX and sexual harassment policies since such policies only apply to 
unwelcome or non-consensual relations,16 it is not always so easy to 
determine whether a sexual relationship is consensual or nonconsensual.17  
The answer to such a question may sometimes change day-to-day given the 
volatile nature of these relationships.  Moreover, one can imagine a subtly 
coercive relationship that causes harm to a student but is nevertheless not 
covered by the institution’s sexual harassment policy.18  One can also 
conceive of a situation in which one day a professor is engaging in a 
mutually-satisfying consensual relationship with a student, only to have a 
sexual harassment charge brought against him or her a month later when 
the relationship sours.  Sexual harassment policies also do not address 
third-party injuries to other students stemming from perceived or real bias 
in their treatment by the involved professor.19  Critics argue that nothing 
less than the academic integrity of the school is at stake in this regard.20
Advocates of this approach maintain that although schools without 
consensual relationship policies seem to be taking a laissez-faire approach 
to student-faculty relationships, the fact of the matter is that existing sexual 
harassment policies may inhibit faculty members from wanting to engage 
in such relationships in the first place given the potential dangers 
involved.21  Critics of the laissez-faire approach do not believe, however, 
that sexual harassment policies and law adequately cover all forms of harm 
that emanate from faculty-student sexual relationships.22  Instead, these 
critics believe that specific language is needed to address the problematic 
nature of these consensual relationships between faculty and students.23  
LEGAL EDUC. 441, 442 (1997) (making this argument in the law school context). 
16. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (establishing 
unwelcomeness as a requisite part of a sexual harassment cause of action under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Hutchens, supra note 2, at 439. 
17. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 497 (noting a “wide gray area” between sexual 
harassment and consensual activity). 
18. See Mack, supra note 2, at 102. 
19. See id. at 97. 
20. See id. at 84-85. 
21. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 499 (“[T]he vast gray areas of sexual harassment law 
leave little if any room for a truly safe relationship, and they create at least some risk in any 
romantic, amorous or intimate behavior with students.”). 
22. See Mack, supra note 2, at 86 (“The argument that a simple sexual harassment 
policy is all a university needs fails to acknowledge that sexual harassment policies do not 
address an adequate range of troubling and potentially harmful situations.”). 
23. See Forell, supra note 2, at 69 (arguing for the adoption of the American 
Association of Law School’s consensual relationship policy at all law schools). 
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B.  The Advisory Approach to Consensual Relationships 
In fact, some schools have written separate faculty-student consensual 
relationship policies,24 but without seeking to directly regulate such 
relationships.25  Instead, the school merely advises faculty and students that 
such relationships are strongly discouraged because of the potential dangers 
inherent in such faculty-student relations for all parties involved.26  In such 
a regime, universities and colleges appear to be making up for imperfect 
information, especially from the student’s perspective, by spelling out for 
the potential participants the consequences of their actions.27
One commentator has suggested in this vein that even though 
professors should not be sexually involved with students with whom they 
have a supervisory or evaluative relationship,28 it is improbable that such a 
policy would eliminate all faculty-student sex.29  Consequently, she urges 
colleges and universities to adopt policies which make available advisory 
and counseling services for students before they enter into such 
relationships.30  Such an advisory approach appears to respect the 
24. In many instances, these consensual relationship policies are a subsection of the 
overall sexual harassment policy.  See Mack, supra note 2, at 86-87.  For a criticism of this 
approach, see Sanger, supra note 2, at 1877-78. 
25. Such schools appear to model their approach on that taken by the American 
Association of University Professors, which encourages faculty members to “avoid any 
exploitation, harassment, or discriminatory treatment of students,” and with regard to 
faculty-student consensual relationships warns that, “[t]he respect and trust accorded a 
professor by a student, as well as the power exercised by the professor in an academic or 
evaluative role, make voluntary consent by the student suspect.”).  See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. 
PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 133, 211 (2001). 
26. The University of Mississippi has adopted such a policy.  It states in part: “The 
educational mission of The University of Mississippi is promoted by professionalism in 
faculty-student and supervisor-subordinate relationships. Therefore, consensual sexual 
relationships between the instructional staff and students, as well as those between 
supervisors and their subordinates, are considered unwise and are strongly discouraged.”  
THE UNIV. OF MISS., SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR FACULTY, 
STAFF AND STUDENTS, available at http://www.olemiss.edu/ 
depts/HR/handbook/HB_sec2.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).  The University of 
Michigan has a similar policy of discouragement.  See UNIV. OF MICH., THE UNIVERSITY OF 
MICHIGAN STANDARD PRACTICE GUIDE § 201.89, at 2-3 (2004), available at 
http://spg.umich.edu/pdf/201.89-0.pdf. (last visited Sept. 24, 2004). 
27. See Sanger, supra note 2, at 1864 (maintaining that for consent to be valid it need 
not only be voluntary, but informed). 
28. See Mack, supra note 2, at 85. 
29. See id. at 80 (“Some universities impose bans in the hope that sanctions will deter 
sexual advances.  But since these bans will not eliminate faculty-student sex, and sexual 
advances will continue to be a problem for some students, those students should be given an 
avenue of support and information by the university.”). 
30. See id. at 80, 82-83, 111-12. 
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autonomy of the student and the professor, while at the same time seeking 
to level the playing field. 
The criticism of such an approach is that it is much too permissive in 
allowing these faculty-student relationships to occur in scenarios clearly 
fraught with peril for all involved, such as where the professor has an 
evaluative or supervisory relationship with the student.31  Furthermore, like 
sexual harassment policies, such policies do a poor job of preventing harm 
to the student, the university, and third parties before the relationship at 
issue has imploded and resulted in a sexual harassment suit or other 
damaging consequences.  Given this reality, critics of these advisory 
policies would say that especially in situations where the professor has a 
conflict of interest in dating a student, and the professor is therefore unable 
to make an informed decision about his ability to separate his private and 
professional lives, the contemplated consensual relationship should, at the 
very least, be disclosed at its inception so that the conflict of interest can be 
effectively managed by a disinterested party.32  Most such advisory 
policies, however, do not even have such disclosure provisions.33
C.  The Conflict of Interest Approach to Consensual Relationships 
Instead of relying on mere precatory language in their policies, an 
increasing number of colleges and universities have taken the next step by 
seeking to ban the most obviously troublesome type of faculty-student 
liaisons, while leaving other such relationships to the discretion of the 
parties or by discouraging such relationships.34  These conflict of interest 
31. See Hutchens, supra note 2, at 419-20; Stokes & Vinik, supra note 2, at 912. 
32. Such a disinterested party might include the head of the faculty member’s 
department or a member of the university administration.  But see Elliott, supra note 2, at 
64-65 (“[T]he requirement that the faculty member report the relationship under pain of 
sanctions . . . [is a] forced disclosure of the personal life of another, regardless of his or her 
consent to the disclosure.”). 
33. Such disclosure policies are reportedly rare in the college and university context.  
See Mack, supra note 2, at 102 n.69. 
34. Professor Young reports that as of 1996, Harvard, Temple, Tufts, and the 
University of Virginia had policies which prohibited supervisory consensual relationships, 
but did not address other types of consensual relationships.  See Young, supra note 2, at 
274-75.  Although the University of California was initially included in this list by Professor 
Young, the University has recently enacted a much more stringent policy.  See Trounson, 
supra note 1, at B1 (describing new policy which bans professors from engaging in 
“romantic or sexual” relationships with students whom they have “or should reasonably 
expect to have in the future” any teaching, evaluative, or supervisory responsibility).  The 
University of Iowa is listed as an example of a university which prohibits supervisory 
relationships and merely discourages other forms of consensual relationships.  See Young, 
supra note 2, at 275. 
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policies35 generally prohibit a faculty member from having an intimate 
relationship with students whom he or she teaches, supervises, or has any 
other type of evaluative relationship.36  In other words, where a professor 
has a conflict of interest in engaging in the relationship with the student, 
the danger is great that the consensual relationship will in some form make 
its way into the classroom or academic environment and interfere with the 
learning environment for all. 
For the professor, not only is there the potential for an abuse of power 
when it comes to grading or evaluating the student-lover,37 there are also 
the concerns of third-party students who worry about being treated less 
favorably because they are not involved in an intimate relationship with the 
professor.38  Additionally, faculty involved in a consensual relationship 
with a student they currently supervise face professional risks, including 
losing the respect of their colleagues and the very real possibility of being 
sued for sexual harassment.39
For the student, the consequences may be just as dramatic.  There may 
be doubts about the student’s genuine intellectual ability given the 
35. This term was coined by Professor Sherry Young.  See Young, supra note 2, at 
274.  Professor Forell also advocates a conflict of interest approach, in line with the 
approach taken by the American Association of Law Schools (AALS).  See Forell, supra 
note 2, at 70-71. 
36. Yale University’s consensual relationship policy bans, as of 1998, a relationship 
between a faculty member and a student “over whom [the faculty member] has direct 
supervisory responsibilities regardless of whether the relationship is consensual,” and 
provides disciplinary measures for those caught engaging in such “conflicts of interest.”  See 
Mack, supra note 2, at 91 (quoting YALE UNIVERSITY, POLICIES ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
AND SEXUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TEACHERS AND STUDENTS 2 (approved 1998)). 
37. See Mack, supra note 2, at 94 (“Because the faculty member and his or her 
colleagues are responsible for grading the student, for writing recommendations, and for 
providing references that will impact the student’s life and career, the faculty member’s 
institutional role enacts a power imbalance even when faculty and students are close in age 
or of the same sex.”). 
38. See William C. Heffernan, Privacy Rights, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 737, 806 (1995) 
(“By contrast, a rationale grounded in concern with third-party harm offers more promising 
support for a per se ban [on faculty-student consensual relationships].  Instructors are under 
a duty to evaluate students’ work impartially.  They have an obligation to apportion benefits 
and sanctions without regard to personal characteristics.”).  Harvard Law School’s policy 
hones in on actual or perceived favoritism as a reason to ban faculty-student relationships 
where the professor supervises in some form the academic progress of the student.  See 
Mack, supra note 2, at 97 (quoting HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
GUIDELINES (Apr. 1995), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/administration/hr/ 
harassment.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2004)).  But see Subotnik, supra note 15, at 442-43 
(“Students paying tuition are entitled only to be graded fairly.  They are not entitled to 
meddle in the affairs of others.”). 
39. See Mack, supra note 2, at 98. 
PAUL M. SECUNDA 11/3/2004  2:05 PM 
64 Syracuse Law Review           [Vol. 55:1 
 
perceived, or real, favoritism at play.40  Additionally, there is always the 
chance of sour grapes on the part of the professor leading to the student 
being disadvantaged in grades, references, and evaluations, as a result of 
the relationship.41  In all, like the professor, a student has a lot to lose when 
it comes to dating a professor who directly supervises the student in one 
capacity or another. 
Criticism of these per se bans on supervisory consensual relationships 
stem from the notion that there may be some such relationships which are 
not coercive and may in fact lead to mutually satisfying involvement for 
both parties.42  Additionally, these critics note that such per se regulation in 
the realm of sexual conduct has already historically caused a great deal of 
harm to women.43  The response given to these critics by proponents of 
conflict of interest consensual relationship policies is for the involved 
parties to just wait until the end of the semester to start or resume their 
relationship.44  Apparently echoing the famous equity principle, “justice 
delayed is justice denied,”45 opponents of these policies reject the 
elimination of freedom of choice in this fundamental area of human 
experience and instead, appear more comfortable with an advisory 
approach which simply discourages such relationships, rather than bans 
them altogether.46
D.  The Prohibitory Approach to Consensual Relations 
Not satisfied to permit even some types of student-faculty consensual 
relationships, a few schools have attempted to ban all such relationships 
outright.47  Finding that such relationships are never truly consensual given 
the apparent power disparities between male professors and their female 
40. See Forell, supra note 2, at 59. 
41. See id. at 58. 
42. See Subotnik, supra note 15, at 442. 
43. Id. at 444 n.13 (observing the historical social stigma placed on all non-marital 
sex); see Elliott, supra note 2, at 59-60 (decrying the patriarchal and neo-Victorian 
assumptions that women are weak and vulnerable and need the protection of consensual 
relationship policies). 
44. See Chamallas, supra note 2, at 858; Forell, supra note 2, at 65. 
45. See Geo. Walter Brewing Co. v. Henseleit, 132 N.W. 631, 632 (Wis. 1911) 
(“Gladstone has truly said: ‘When the case is proved, and the hour is come, justice delayed 
is justice denied.’”).
46. See Subotnik, supra note 15, at 442. 
47. Professor Young cites her own school, Ohio Northern University, as a school with 
a complete ban.  See Young, supra note 2, at 271 n.11, 276.  However, Mack has pointed 
out that the actual language seems more discretionary than mandatory.  See Mack, supra 
note 2, at 87 n.22.  William and Mary and Ohio Wesleyan University have new consensual 
relationship policies which actually constitute absolute bans.  See Trounson, supra note 1, at 
B1; Sidoti, supra note 1, at A11. 
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students,48 that such relationships inevitably demean female students,49 or 
that such relationships always disadvantage other students in the class or 
department who are not participating in the sexual relationship,50 these 
schools seek to prohibit these relationships before they can damage the 
academic integrity of the institution.51
Critics of such policies argue that such outright prohibitions interfere 
impermissibly with the rights of privacy and association, constitutional and 
otherwise, and deny individual autonomy and dignity to those affected.52  
Others argue that such absolute bans on consensual relationships force 
individuals to lie about their private associations, thus undermining the 
ability of the university to regulate itself.53
Interestingly, although some feminists agree with the prohibitory 
approach by arguing there is no such thing as meaningful consent in a 
relationship with such power differentials,54 other feminists criticize such 
prohibitions as being demeaning and limiting.  Professor Sherry Young, for 
instance, sees such policies as infantilizing women (whom it is argued are 
generally victimized by such relationships) by not respecting women’s 
capacity to make responsible decisions in their own best interests.55  
48. Proponents of the prohibitory approach improperly assume that the chief victims of 
faculty-student consensual relationships are female students involved with their male 
professors.  See generally BILLIE WRIGHT DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS 
PROFESSOR: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS (2d ed. 1990).  See also CATHERINE 
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 
298 n.8 (1979) (“[W]hether, under conditions of male supremacy, the notion of consent has 
any real meaning for women . . . whether it is a structural fiction to legitimize the real 
coercion built into the normal social definitions of heterosexual intercourse . . . .”).  
Although historically female students were much more at risk in a male-dominated academy 
to be exploited in such consensual relationships, recent trends concerning faculty hiring, the 
increased frequency of open homosexual relationships, and anecdotal stories concerning 
consensual relationships between female faculty members and their male and female 
students, makes the focus of such consensual relationship policies solely on the potential 
harm to the female student inappropriately narrow.  As a consequence, I refer to the student 
in gender neutral terms throughout this article.  See Forell, supra note 2, at 50 (“Since the 
central harms have to do with abuse of power, often the parties’ gender is of no particular 
importance.”). 
49. See Mack, supra note 2, at 81 (“I cannot see much advantage to giving women the 
message that their value in college and graduate school is sexual.”  Id.). 
50. Id. at 82. 
51. See Sanger, supra note 2, at 1858-59. 
52. See Elliott, supra note 2, at 69; see also Sidoti, supra note 1, at A11. 
53. See Forell, supra note 2, at 69 (quoting Leon Botstein, Forum, New Rules About 
Sex on Campus, HARPER’S, Sept. 1993, at 37). 
54. See supra note 48. 
55. See Young, supra note 2, at 270 (“The suggestion that otherwise competent adult 
women are so incapable of making decisions about their personal lives that colleges and 
universities should step in and regulate their sexuality is not an obviously feminist 
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Professor Jane Gallop goes even further by suggesting that such sexual 
liaisons between students and their professors help fill out the educational 
experience for students.56
Since this zero tolerance approach has been the most controversial, it 
should not be surprising that higher education institutions have rarely 
adopted this type of policy.57
II.  THE LABOR ARBITRATION LAW PERSPECTIVE ON EMPLOYEE PRIVATE 
CONSENSUAL SEXUAL CONDUCT 
Although these types of faculty-student consensual relationship 
policies are different in their regulatory approach to relations between 
faculty members and students, all are similar in their failure to recognize a 
fundamental truth about the professor whose behavior they seek to regulate 
through these policies: the professor is an employee of the university.  And 
from the perspective of the professor qua employee, the question must be 
asked, as it would be in any employment relationship, “What right does a 
college or university employer have to interfere with the private affairs of 
its employees?”58
While colleges and universities have had relatively little experience in 
regulating the private sexual conduct of their faculty members, labor 
arbitrators have been in the business of hearing off-duty conduct disputes 
for more than a half-century.59  By considering the principles upon which 
labor arbitrators decide these off-duty conduct cases, one can gain 
important insight into how college and university administrators should 
shape their faculty-student consensual relationship policies. 
position.”); see also Sanger, supra note 2, at 1853 (citing JANE GALLOP, FEMINIST ACCUSED 
OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 38-39 (Duke Univ. Press 1997)). 
56. See Mack, supra note 2, at 93 n.39.  Professor Gallop has expressed elsewhere that 
she is also concerned that, “The policies don’t distinguish between relations that students 
want and relations that students don’t want.”  Sidoti, supra note 1, at A11. 
57. See Mack supra note 2, at 110; Stokes & Vinik, supra note 2, at 901 (observing 
that proposals to ban faculty-student consensual relationships had been defeated at the 
University of Virginia, the University of Texas at Arlington, and the University of 
Washington). 
58. At the very least, neither a college nor university, nor any other employer, has carte 
blanche in making any and all demands concerning its employee’s private sexual conduct.  
See Subotnik, supra note 15, at 442 (“For all that has been written about the relation 
between sex and power, to the best of my knowledge no one has advocated an absolute ban 
on sexual relationships between supervisor and subordinate in the workplace.”). 
59. The earliest reported labor arbitration case that the author was able to find 
concerning discipline imposed for employee off-duty conduct is from 1944.  See Ford Motor 
Co., Opinion A-132 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.). 
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This section is divided into three parts.  In the first section, I review 
the basics of labor arbitration for those unfamiliar with the process.  In the 
second part, I discuss general arbitration principles that apply to an 
employer’s regulation of employee off-duty conduct.  Last, I examine labor 
arbitration cases that specifically discuss whether an employer has the 
ability to discipline or discharge an employee for engaging in different 
types of private consensual sexual conduct. 
A.  A Primer on Labor Arbitration 
For those unfamiliar with American labor law, it is helpful to first 
understand the origins of a labor arbitrator’s decisional powers.  Once a 
union has successfully organized a group of employees and has been 
selected or designated the collective bargaining representative for that 
group of employees,60 the union and the employer sit down and attempt to 
hammer out a collective bargaining agreement across the bargaining 
table.61  As a quid pro quo for agreeing not to engage in a strike or other 
work stoppage during the terms of the agreement, parties generally agree to 
arbitrate their employment disputes.62  Generally, under such agreements to 
arbitrate, a procedure is established to select an arbitrator, who is then 
empowered by the parties to interpret the meaning of the provisions in their 
collective bargaining agreement.63
Arbitrators use their experience and expertise in industrial relations to 
interpret the collective bargaining agreement in a way that best meets the 
expectations of the parties to the agreement.64  This is especially important 
when the arbitrator is called upon to decide a discharge or discipline case in 
which a “just cause” or “good cause” provision must be applied to 
determine if the employer’s discipline of an employee is consistent with the 
60. Under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000), employees 
are guaranteed the right to self-organization, to join or assist a labor organization, to engage 
in collective bargaining through a representative of their own choosing, and to engage in 
concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for other mutual aid or 
protection.  See id. § 157. 
61. See id. § 159(a) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of 
collective bargaining by the majority of employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, 
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of 
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other 
conditions of employment . . . .”). 
62. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 
(1957) (recognizing that agreements to arbitrate are the quid pro quo of a no-strike clause). 
63. For a thorough discussion on arbitration provisions in collective bargaining 
agreements, see generally ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 712-
20 (13th ed. 2001) [hereinafter LABOR LAW]. 
64. See id. at 717-18. 
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terms of the collective bargaining agreement.65  Although arbitrators are 
not judges in the traditional sense, in making these determinations they do 
hear witnesses, consider evidence, and issue rulings based on their findings 
and their interpretation of the underlying contractual language.66
Additionally, although arbitrators are only invested with the power to 
determine the contours of specific collective bargaining agreements, a 
consistent body of case law has developed over the years with regard to 
common terms in these agreements, such as “just cause.”  A number of 
these decisions are reported in the Labor Arbitration Reports and similar 
publications, and arbitrators are generally guided by principles which can 
be gleaned from past arbitral decisions.67
B.  Employee Off-Duty Conduct and the Nexus Test 
In applying the just cause provisions of a given labor contract to 
determine the appropriateness of employer discipline, arbitrators have had 
to grapple over the proper role of employers in regulating the off-duty 
conduct of their employees.  In these cases, arbitrators seek to resolve the 
tension between an employer’s right to protect its business interests and the 
employee’s right to be free from employer interference on his or her own 
time.68
In most of these off-duty cases, arbitrators are reluctant to sustain 
employee discharges.69  Regardless of the egregiousness of employee 
conduct while away from the workplace, arbitrators have observed that 
society does not generally believe that employers should be endowed with 
powers to sanction such conduct.70  Yet, it is also true that there is not 
65. See COMM. ON ADR IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, DISCIPLINE 
AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION 29 (1998) (“The central concept permeating discipline and 
discharge arbitrations is ‘just cause.’  Most collective bargaining agreements explicitly 
prohibit the employer from disciplining or discharging employees without just cause.  Even 
in the absence of specific contract language, just cause is the touchstone by which 
arbitrators judge employer actions.”). 
66. See LABOR LAW, supra note 63, at 718-19. 
67. See Lone Star Gas Co., 56 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1221, 1226 (1971) (Johannes, 
Arb.) (“Although the opinions of arbitrators who decided similar cases in the past are only 
advisory, it is worthwhile to review past decisions in determining the proper action in this 
case.”). 
68. See id. at 1225. 
69. See Robertshaw Controls Co., 64-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) ¶ 8748, 5613 (1964) 
(Duff, Arb.). 
70. “The reason why the corporation . . . may not usually penalize [the employee] for 
actions away from the plant and on his own time is not because the corporation is no longer 
his employer, but because ordinarily such actions do not have a sufficiently direct effect 
upon the efficient performance of plant operations to be reasonably considered good cause 
for discipline.”  Off-Duty Misconduct, in LABOR LAW & LABOR ARBITRATION 1998, at 62 
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necessarily an easily discernible line between what constitutes on-duty 
conduct as opposed to off-duty conduct.71  Cases involving serious 
employee conduct such as drug use, drug dealing72 and other felonious 
conduct away from the workplace (including assault and various types of 
“immoral conduct”),73 have forced labor arbitrators to develop standards to 
determine when it is appropriate for employers to discipline or discharge its 
employees for conduct away from the workplace. 
In the most general terms, arbitrators have only permitted employers 
to discipline employees for off-duty conduct if that conduct has a 
detrimental impact on the workplace itself.74  In other words, there needs to 
be some “nexus” between the employee off-duty conduct and the business 
of the employer.75  As early as 1957, arbitrators looked to three factors to 
(Labor Arbitration Institute, 1998) [hereinafter Off-Duty Misconduct]; see also Allied 
Supermarkets, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 713, 714 (1963) (Mittenthal, Arb.) (finding 
that employer cannot ordinarily discipline employee for behavior off company premises and 
after working hours); William H. Welsh Co., 20 Lab.Arb. Rep. (BNA) 175, 177 (1953) 
(Marks, Arb.) (same). 
71. The employee relationship does not necessarily terminate when the employee’s 
work day is over and he or she heads home.  See Allied Supermarkets, 41 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) at 714 (“The point is that the jurisdictional line which limits the Companys’ [sic] 
power to discipline is a functional, not a physical line.”); Inland Container Corp., 28 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 312, 314 (1957) (Ferguson, Arb.) (“While it is true that the employer does 
not . . . become the guardian of the employee’s every personal action and does not exercise 
parental control, it is equally true that in those areas having to do with the employer’s 
business, the employer has the right to terminate the relationship if the employee’s wrongful 
actions injuriously affect the business.”). 
72. See, e.g., Trane Co., 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 435, 438 (1991) (Reynolds, Arb.) 
(employee engaging in off-duty drug dealing); W.R. Grace & Co., 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
1210, 1212-13 (1989) (Odom, Arb.) (same). 
73. See, e.g., Westvaco Corp., 95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 169, 171 (1990) (Abrams, 
Arb.) (employee indicted for off-duty assault of woman); Lone Star Gas Co., 56 Lab. Arb. 
Rep. (BNA) 1221, 1226-27 (1971) (Johannes, Arb.) (employee convicted of crime of 
incest); Northwest Airlines, Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 203, 205-06 (1969) (Sembower, 
Arb.) (criminal charges based on indecent nude photography); Robertshaw Controls, 64-2 
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) at 5613-14 (employee convicted for felony involving sexual 
perversion with young boys). 
74. See, e.g., Ralphs Grocery Co., 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 867, 871 (1981) 
(Kaufman, Arb.) (off-duty conduct not subject to discipline or discharge unless adverse 
effect on operation of employer’s business); Allied Supermarkets, 41 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
at 714 (“[W]here [off-duty] behavior is directly related to his employment, Management 
certainly has the power to discipline.”) (emphasis in original); W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 434, 437 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.) (Although employee was guilty of 
public intoxication, “no harm was done to the Company because he was not at work or on 
Company property when he became involved in his trouble.”); Crane Co., 12 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 592, 595 (1949) (Gilden, Arb.) (same). 
75. MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & MARK L. KAHN, Discipline and Discharge for Off-Duty 
Misconduct: What are the Arbitral Standards, in ARBITRATION 1986: CURRENT AND 
EXPANDING ROLES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL 
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determine if the requisite nexus existed to discipline employees for off-duty 
conduct.76  In W.E. Caldwell Co., Arbitrator Louis Kesselman famously 
held that an employee discharge for off-duty conduct is usually not 
appropriate unless: (1) the conduct harms the employer’s product or 
reputation; (2) the conduct renders the employee unable to effectively 
perform his or her job; or (3) the conduct leads other employees to refuse to 
work with him or her.77  Later cases made clear that the employer has the 
burden of showing any such adverse effects to justify disciplining an 
employee.78
The nexus standard utilized in off-duty conduct cases suggests there 
can be no bright-line rule in deciding these cases.79  More frequently, 
arbitrators have employed an ad hoc approach to determine whether an 
employee’s off-duty conduct has injured an employer’s business in a given 
case to decide whether employee discipline or discharge is appropriate 
under the circumstances.80  Only when an employee’s off-duty conduct 
injures an employer’s business in some relevant manner do arbitrators 
generally permit an employer to terminate or otherwise discipline an 
employee for engaging in such conduct.  Moreover, because there is the 
real potential of an employer abusing the nexus test to dispose of trouble-
making or unwanted employees, arbitrators have also required that the 
connection between the injury caused to the employer’s business and the 
employee’s off-duty conduct be reasonable and discernible.81
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 121, 124 (Walter J. Gershenfeld ed., 1987) (“In general, 
arbitrators are reluctant to sustain discipline or discharge based on off-duty misconduct . . . 
absent some relationship or ‘nexus’ to the job.”). 
76. Indeed, as early as 1949, labor arbitrators were requiring that an employee’s 
extracurricular activities have a “direct bearing” upon their employment status before an 
employer could have a just basis for disciplining them.  See Crane, 12 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) at 595. 
77. 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 436-37. 
78. See Ralphs Grocery, 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 871. 
79. In fact, many arbitrators acknowledge that a case-by-case approach must be taken 
in deciding these cases.  See Allied Supermarkets, 41 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 714 (“Absent 
evidence of past practice or specific agreement by the parties on disciplinary standards, the 
arbitrator’s decision as to whether certain conduct is ‘proper cause’ for discharge must turn 
on the peculiar facts of each dispute.”); Inland Container, 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 314 
(“Each [employee off-duty conduct] case must be measured on its own merits.”). 
80. See St. Paul Pub. Schs. Indep. Sch. Dist. 625, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 503, 506 
(1993) (Imes, Arb.) (“In determining whether there is a ‘nexus’, each incident must be 
carefully examined and the conclusion based upon the merits of that case and that case 
alone . . . .”). 
81. See Inland Container, 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 314 (“The connection between 
the facts which occur and the extent to which the business is affected must be reasonable 
and discernible.  They must be such as could logically be expected to cause some result in 
the employer’s affairs.”); see also W.E. Caldwell, 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 437 (“The 
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C.  Labor Arbitration Cases Applying the Nexus Test to Employee  
Private Consensual Sexual Conduct 
Although there are few arbitration decisions concerning discharge of 
employees for engaging in private consensual sexual relationships, the 
existing cases provide some important insight into how labor arbitrators 
have historically handled such fact patterns.  As will be illustrated below, 
arbitrators have long been hesitant in the non-criminal context to enforce 
discipline against employees for off-duty sexual activities that do not 
adversely affect the employer.82
For instance, during the early development of arbitration law, male 
employers were more likely to act in a paternalistic and intrusive manner 
with regard to the off-duty conduct of their female employees.  Indeed, it 
was not uncommon for a male employer to discharge a female employee 
because he disapproved of her private life outside of the workplace.83  
Frequent examples of this type of employer action involved instances in 
which an employer would justify firing a female employee because she had 
children without being married or engaged in an adulterous affair.84
In spite of the more conservative climate of that time, arbitrators 
would generally not find the requisite nexus for upholding the employee 
discharge.85  For instance, in the Allied Supermarkets case in which a 
female employee was discharged for becoming an unwed mother for the 
second time, Arbitrator Mittenthal overturned the discharge stating that he, 
“doubt[ed] that the public holds an employer answerable for the morals of 
his employees after working hours,” and that, in any event, it was purely 
speculative as to what influence the employee’s off-duty conduct would 
have on other employees.86
Arbitrators’ rulings have been much the same in more recent cases as 
well.  One such example is In re Ralphs Grocery Co., in which the 
charge that his experience might start a ‘bad tendency’ among the other employees is merely 
hypothetical and cannot be taken seriously without proof.”). 
82. COMM. ON ADR IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 65, at 307. 
83. See, e.g., Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 713, 714 (1963) 
(Mittenthal, Arb.). 
84. See id. at 713 (female employee discharged because of immoral character because 
she had become pregnant for the second time without being married); Ralphs Grocery Co., 
77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 867, 869 (1981) (Kaufman, Arb.) (female employee fired after 
having adulterous affair with married male manager); Crane Co., 12 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
592, 595 (1949) (Gilden, Arb.) (discharge of female employee for “illegitimate pregnancy”). 
85. See Allied Supermarkets, 41 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 714-15. 
86. Id at 714; see also Crane, 12 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 595 (discharge of female 
employee for having an illegitimate child overturned because conduct had no relevance to 
the nature of the employee’s job duties). 
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employee was constructively discharged for being a homosexual.87  The 
employer was concerned that a gay man could not be an effective leader in 
its organization and that gay and straight employees would not want to 
work together if employees’ sexual orientation became known.88  
Arbitrator Kaufman overturned the discharge, finding that the employer 
had not met its burden of establishing a discernible adverse impact on the 
employer’s business stemming from the employee’s homosexuality.89  In 
this regard, Arbitrator Kaufman held that off-duty conduct is beyond 
employer control unless it “adversely affects the operation of the 
business[,] [t]hat [it] must be no less true for homosexual than heterosexual 
conduct,” and that, “disapproval [of one’s lifestyle choice] does not satisfy 
the contractual standard of good cause.”90
In another case, a secretary was fired for misconduct for engaging in 
an off-duty romantic affair with her boss.91  Overturning her discharge, the 
arbitrator noted that the secretary and her boss were “consenting adults,” 
and that, “[t]here [was] more evidence that they had genuine affection for 
each other than there [was] that this was a case of seduction by the 
‘Boss.’”92  Under these circumstances, the arbitrator ruled that it was 
impossible to say with certainty what impact, if any, this consensual 
relationship had on the workplace.93
Of course, relationships between co-employees, and employees and 
non-employees, do not always neatly remain off-duty and off-premises.  If 
87. 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 869 (Although the homosexual employee was not 
discharged, he resigned after he was demoted and was given the midnight shift in what he 
considered to be a dangerous neighborhood.). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. For instance, Arbitrator Kaufman observed that there was no showing of 
customer complaints or employee complaints because the employee was a homosexual.  Id. 
at 871. 
90. Id.; see also Bazor Express, Inc., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 307, 309 (1966) (Duff, 
Arb.).  But see Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 891, 893 (1961) 
(Duff, Arb.) (upholding employer’s decision to terminate employee for off-duty drug 
use/drug dealing). 
91. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 132, 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 254, 255 
(1977) (Wagner, Arb.). 
92. Id. at 256. 
93. Id.  In yet other cases, employers have attempted to institute so-called “anti-
fraternization rules” in order to keep co-employees from dating one another.  Arbitrators 
have generally only upheld such employer policies if sufficient justification was shown.  
See, e.g., Alterman Foods, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 459 (1965) (Woodruff, Arb.).  In 
Alterman Foods, a love triangle of one employee dating the wife of another employee had 
led to a shooting at the company.  See id. at 460.  When a similar love triangle thereafter 
came to the attention of the employer, one of the offending employees was discharged under 
a new anti-fraternization rule.  Id.  The arbitrator upheld the discharge finding that the 
discharge was reasonable given the company’s past history.  Id. at 461. 
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such relationships spill over into the work environment, arbitrators have 
historically not hesitated to allow the sanctioning of such conduct by 
employers.  The crucial distinction in these cases appears to be both the 
inevitable third-party effects of such relationships and the conflicts of 
interest that are normally involved.  An example of such a case is 
Wyndham Franklin Plaza Hotel, in which an employee was fired after 
being taped engaging in sexual relations with her supervisor during 
working hours on the hotel’s premises.94  Arbitrator Duff agreed with the 
employer that it had a legitimate interest in sanctioning such behavior 
because such conduct “potentially tarnish[ed] the image or reputation of the 
[hotel],” and because “[the employee] was having sex at work with a 
Supervisor who was directly responsible for reporting her hours of work for 
pay purposes . . . .”95  Although the arbitrator overturned the employee’s 
discharge for violation of her due process rights,96 this case clearly 
establishes the arbitral principle that private sexual relationships that occur 
at the workplace are normally the proper subject of regulation because of 
the inevitable conflicts of interest that are involved and because of the fact 
that the conduct in question is “so widely known and is so deplorable that it 
harms the employer’s business interests.”97
III.  SHOULD THE LABOR ARBITRATION NEXUS PRINCIPLE APPLY 
IN THE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY SETTING? 
Having established the applicable labor arbitration principles 
concerning employer regulation of employee private consensual sexual 
conduct, two pertinent questions remain.  First, is the college and university 
setting analogous enough to the unionized employment setting so that it is 
appropriate to apply the nexus principle in the college and university 
context?  Second, is the dynamic between a faculty member and a student 
94. 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 186, 187 (1995) (Duff, Arb.).  The surveillance camera 
had been secretly placed in the ceiling because of the employer’s concern about theft by its 
employees.  Id. 
95. Id. at 188. 
96. The arbitrator found that the employee’s Weingarten rights were violated because 
her request for union representation at her disciplinary interview was refused by the 
employer.  NLRB v. J. Weingarten , Inc. 420 U.S. 251 (1975); Wyndham Franklin Plaza 
Hotel, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 189. 
97. COMM. ON ADR IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 65, at 305.  While 
reputational interests and conflicts of interest were at play in the Wyndham case, off-duty 
consensual relationships which spill over into the workplace can also directly affect the 
ability of an employee to effectively perform his or her job.  For instance, in Warren 
Petroleum Corp., the arbitrator found, “[T]he Company was justified in discharging Mr. X 
on account of the fact that his marital difficulties . . . interfere[d] with the normal discharge 
of his duties at the plant.”  26 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 184, 186 (1956) (Singletary, Arb.). 
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comparable enough to a supervisor-subordinate employment relationship, 
or any other employment relationship, so that application of the nexus 
principle makes sense in the college and university context? 
A.  The “Special” Status of Colleges and Universities Should Not Affect 
Utilization of the Nexus Principle in the Higher Education Context 
Colleges and universities have traditionally enjoyed a special status in 
the eyes of the law and have been granted a large amount of deference from 
courts when making decisions pertaining to educational matters.98  This 
deference stems from both the expertise exercised by college and university 
decision-makers in educational matters,99 as well as from notions of 
academic freedom, including the institution’s ability to make autonomous 
decisions for itself without interference from external actors.100  Most 
recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this traditional 
deferential approach in the higher education context by permitting the 
University of Michigan to consider race when making law school 
admission decisions in order to promote diversity at the school.101  Thus, 
some may make the argument that courts and other decision-makers should 
grant colleges and universities a wider degree of latitude in regulating 
faculty-student consensual relationships than would otherwise be 
permissible in other employment contexts. 
There are, however, at least two reasons why this deference is 
unwarranted in the context of regulating faculty-student consensual 
relationships.  First, the emphasis in prior Supreme Court cases concerning 
deference to university and college judgments has not been on all 
98. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (recognizing 
that colleges and universities have been traditionally granted much autonomy in decisions 
relating to educational matters). 
99. See Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (“[T]he 
determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert 
evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of 
judicial or administrative decisionmaking.”).
100. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (“Added to our concern for lack of standards is a 
reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational institutions and our 
responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom, ‘a special concern of the First 
Amendment.’”) (quoting Keyishian v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967)); id. at 226 n.12 (academic freedom thrives “on autonomous decisionmaking by the 
academy itself”) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) 
(opinion of Powell, J.) and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)).
101. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003) (“Our holding today is in 
keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic 
decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”).
PAUL M. SECUNDA 11/3/2004  2:05 PM 
2005] Getting to the Nexus of the Matter 75 
 
university or college decisions, but on academic decisions.102  Indeed, there 
is an equal tradition of reviewing colleges’ and universities’ academic and 
disciplinary decisions under different standards.103  Thus, courts have been 
more willing to review disciplinary decisions of colleges and universities 
than academic decisions.104  This is because unlike their familiarity in 
reviewing disciplinary matters, “[c]ourts are particularly ill-equipped to 
evaluate academic performance.”105
Although there are no doubt many academic concerns, including 
perceived favoritism, regarding the regulation of faculty-student consensual 
relationships, disciplining a faculty member for breach of a consensual 
relationship policy is at essence a disciplinary decision.  This is because an 
academic decision “by its nature [is] more subjective and evaluative than 
the typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary 
decision.”106  All told, academic judgments revolve around subjective, 
expert decisions about merit, while disciplinary judgments concern factual 
conclusions about conduct.107  Under this dichotomy, applying the terms of 
a faculty-student consensual relationship policy to discipline a professor 
would be a disciplinary action for which the postsecondary institution 
should enjoy no increased deference from a judicial decision-maker. 
The counter-argument is that the college or university is taking the 
disciplinary action not to merely sanction unprofessional conduct, but, 
more importantly, to protect the academic integrity of the institution and to 
102. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 (“When judges are asked to review the substance of a 
genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the 
faculty’s professional judgment.”) (emphasis added); Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 96 n.6 (Powell, 
J., concurring) (“University faculties must have the widest range of discretion in making 
judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitlement to promotion or 
graduation.”) (emphasis added).
103. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86-87 (“The need for flexibility is well illustrated by 
the significant difference between the failure of a student to meet academic standards and 
the violation by a student of valid rules of conduct . . . .  Since the issue first arose 50 years 
ago, state and lower federal courts have recognized that there are distinct differences 
between decisions to suspend or dismiss a student for disciplinary purposes and similar 
actions taken for academic reasons which may call for hearings in connection with the 
former but not the latter.”).
104. Id. at 88-90 (“[S]uspensions of students for disciplinary reasons have a sufficient 
resemblance to traditional judicial and administrative factfinding to call for a ‘hearing’ 
before the relevant school authority. . . .  Like the decision of an individual professor as to 
the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student 
for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not 
readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.”).
105. Id. at 92. 
106. Id. at 90. 
107. See id. at 89-90, 93 (Powell, J., concurring) (contrasting student dismissal for 
academic deficiencies rather than for unsatisfactory personal conduct).
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avoid perceived favoritism in the academic environment.  The problem 
with this argument is that it proves too much.  Essentially, any disciplinary 
decision in the postsecondary context could be transformed through this 
reasoning into an academic one by claiming the discipline was taken for the 
greater good of the academic community.  But, of course, that is true for 
almost any disciplinary action taken in the academic environment.108  The 
danger is that intimate relationships between consenting adults will be held 
hostage to the preferences of others who may have a preexisting dislike for 
the professor or student under scrutiny.109  To avoid these issues, the focus 
of the inquiry into whether a decision is a disciplinary or academic one 
should be the subject of the discipline (in this case, the faculty member), 
and not the hypothetical impact that such conduct is having on third 
parties.110  Focusing on the faculty member, the employee being 
sanctioned, the school’s actions are clearly of a disciplinary nature. 
However, even if one were to maintain that this regulation of 
consensual relationships involves academic judgments, there is still a 
second reason why institutions should not be given more latitude to 
promulgate consensual relationship policies.  Although academic 
institutions have been historically portrayed as the protectors of academic 
freedom, there is also equally important language in these decisions to 
support the proposition that colleges and universities must be especially 
vigilant of constitutional freedoms.111  Because the privacy and 
associational rights of its faculty members are at stake when their 
consensual relationships are regulated, and these interests are of a 
constitutional nature in at least the public university context,112 the college 
and university employer should be even more wary before attempting to 
regulate a consensual relationship that does not have a detrimental impact 
108. For instance, when the school suspends a student for hazing another student in the 
fraternity or sorority context, the action is no doubt a disciplinary action taken for 
unsatisfactory personal conduct, but the discipline also has the beneficial effect of fostering 
a better learning environment for all. 
109. See Off-Duty Misconduct, supra note 70, at 59. 
110. See Subotnik, supra note 15, at 442-43.  Of course, if the surrounding 
circumstances suggest that the faculty member has engaged in illegitimate acts of 
favoritism, a concerned student could still always file a complaint with the proper academic 
administrator.  See id. at 443 n.7.  Professor Subotnik argues that it is the fear of such an 
investigation following a complaint being filed that has kept known abuses to a minimum.  
Id. 
111. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
schools.”). 
112. See generally Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence’s Quintessential Millian Movement and 
Its Impact on the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2005). 
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on the college and university environment.  In such instances, the college 
or university should not be seen as having a legitimate reason for 
interfering with the privacy and associational rights of their faculty and 
students.113
In all, the “special” status of colleges and universities under the law 
for academic decision-making and for protection of academic freedom 
should not require a different standard than the nexus principle when a 
college or university, in its employer capacity, seeks to regulate the off-
duty conduct of its faculty members.  If anything, efforts to limit the private 
behavior of employees in the public, postsecondary setting must be even 
more narrowly tailored given that the constitutional freedoms of faculty 
members and students are at stake.114
B.  Faculty-Student Relationships Are Akin to Supervisor-Subordinate 
Relationships Which Are Subject to the Nexus Principle 
In the non-academic employment world there typically exists a 
supervisor or manager who is responsible for reviewing a subordinate 
employee’s work and who may also play a significant role in making 
decisions concerning that employee’s future career.115  In many work 
places, the control the supervisor exercises over his or her subordinate is 
especially comprehensive because the supervisor and subordinate work 
closely together during the day and over a significant period of time.116  
Conversely, unless a professor is a thesis advisor to a graduate student, 
students will only have most professors once during their academic careers, 
and such associations are short-lived given the length of the semester.117  
Moreover, a student, unlike a subordinate employee usually can avoid a 
boorish professor by not registering for his or her class.118  Finally, most 
113. And, of course, paternalism and stereotyped notions of women’s ability to take 
responsibility for their own actions are not legitimate reasons.  See Young, supra note 2, at 
270 (“The notion that (predominantly male) administrators should feel free to ignore a 
woman’s own perceptions and stated preferences about her life and her exercise of her own 
sexuality is deeply anti-feminist.”).  But see Forell, supra note 2, at 63-64 (“The reason for 
regulating faculty-student sex is not that students are immature, or that women don’t know 
what they want: the reason is that the power disparity is too great.”). 
114. See Secunda, supra note 112. 
115. For instance, a supervisor not only could be instrumental in terminating an 
employee from his current employment, but depending on the nature of the employment, the 
supervisor may also drastically limit future work opportunities for the employee with other 
employers.  This type of situation can be of special concern when an employee is limited by 
his or her skill set to a relatively narrow group of potential jobs. 
116. See Subotnik, supra note 15, at 442. 
117. See id. 
118. See id. 
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students are early enough in their careers that one professor cannot 
substantially interfere with their future careers the way that a supervisor 
can.119
All told, then, supervisors appear to exercise more power over their 
subordinates than professors do over their students.120  In spite of the 
obvious power differentials between supervisors and subordinates, labor 
arbitrators apply the same nexus standard to private consensual relations 
between a supervisor and a subordinate as they do in co-employee or 
employee/non-employee off-duty relationships.121  The arbitral focus is not 
on the power disparity between the supervisor and subordinate, but rather 
on whether the employer has a legitimate concern that the relationship will 
have a discernible and detrimental impact on its business.122  If the 
employer can show no such impact, then the employer has no cognizable 
interest in regulating that relationship.123  Thus, although faculty members 
play an important, and in some respects, unique role in the lives of their 
students, it is not at all clear to this author why such a power relationship 
differs significantly from a typical supervisor-subordinate relationship in 
the ordinary employment setting.124
119. See supra note 115. 
120. See, e.g., Subotnik, supra note 15, at 442 (arguing that there is a greater power 
differential between a supervisor and a subordinate than a professor and a student).  
Professor Forell argues that professors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of 
their students because there are issues of trust and a significant imbalance in the parties’ 
power.  See Forell, supra note 2, at 50, 54.  Based on this view, one wonders if Professor 
Forell would find that supervisors in an ordinary employment relationship have a fiduciary 
duty to their subordinate employees because of the even greater power imbalance and 
similar trust issues involved.  Such a view would certainly be remarkable given that 
fiduciary duties have never been recognized in normal employment relationships.  See 
Edward Greer, What’s Wrong with Faculty-Student Sex?: Response I, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
437, 439 (1997) (arguing that Professor Forell’s theory of a professor having a fiduciary 
duty toward a student “is a deus ex machina whose sole purpose is to provide a rationale for 
sanctions.”). 
121. Compare Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 132, 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
254, 256 (1977) (Wagner, Arb.) (overturning discharge of secretary where unclear what 
impact, if any, her consensual relationship with her boss had on the workplace) with Warren 
Petroleum Corp., 26 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 184, 186 (1956) (Singletary, Arb.) (upholding 
an employee termination where off-duty marital difficulties between the employee and his 
non-employee spouse had started to detrimentally impact the work environment). 
122. See Chamallas, supra note 2, at 854 (arguing that focus of consensual relationship 
policies should not be on the actual nature of the relationship, but rather on the potential of 
the relationship to cause exploitation or external harm). 
123. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. 
124. See Subotnik, supra note 15, at 442; see also Sanger, supra note 2, at 1868 
(recognizing that as in the normal employment context, faculty-student consensual 
relationships in the college and university setting may also “cause divisiveness among co-
workers as a result of blurring the line between one’s private life and one’s 
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Faculty-student relationships are also similar to normal off-duty 
employee conduct in at least three other relevant ways.  First, and most 
obviously, faculty members are employees.  Indeed, labor arbitrators have 
applied the same nexus principles in the educational milieu as they have in 
non-educational employment contexts.125  Second, the fact that employees 
subject to labor arbitration principles have increased job security through 
just cause provisions in their collective bargaining agreements, while many 
faculty members do not, is not a distinction with any significance for 
purposes of this analysis.  Just cause is just another way of establishing that 
an employer cannot fire an employee for an unfair reason.126  Similarly, 
tenured and untenured professors would not generally be disciplined or 
discharged under a faculty-student consensual relationship policy without 
sufficient evidence to substantiate the institution’s claims of such a 
relationship.127  Third, and finally, although students are not employees of 
the university in most instances, this fact should not affect the application 
of the nexus principle insofar as consensual relationship policies are 
directed primarily at faculty members and not students.128  In this regard, 
such faculty-student relationships are similar to a regular employment 
situation in which an arbitrator applies the nexus principle to determine 
whether the discipline of an employee for private consensual conduct with 
a non-employee is permissible.129
To sum up, neither the faculty-student power dynamic, nor the union 
setting of labor arbitration cases, nor the fact that the student is not an 
employee of the university, drastically affects the imposition of the nexus 
principle on faculty-student relationships.  Of course, that being said, our 
inquiry does not end there.  It is still necessary to determine which of the 
previously discussed approaches to faculty-student consensual 
relationships, if any, is most consistent with the nexus principle, or whether 
an altogether new approach should be implemented. 
workplace . . . .”). 
125. See, e.g., St. Paul Pub. Schs. Indep. Sch. Dist. 625, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
503, 506 (1993) (Imes, Arb.). 
126. See COMM. ON ADR IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 65, at 29. 
127. Additionally, tenured faculty members have job security in line with the just cause 
protections that union members enjoy.  See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997). 
128. See supra note 5. 
129. See, e.g., Warren Petroleum, 26 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 186 (nexus principle 
applied in upholding discharge of employee when marital difficulties with non-employee 
spouse started to affect the work environment). 
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IV.  A PROPOSAL: THE SLIDING SCALE APPROACH TO FACULTY-STUDENT 
CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIP POLICIES 
Reevaluation of current faculty-student relationship policies in light of 
labor arbitration law’s nexus principle clarifies the inappropriateness of 
existing approaches to regulating these relationships.  Because of the fact-
specific nature of such consensual relationships and their variable impact 
on the college and university environment, labor arbitration principles 
suggest that previous approaches to faculty-student consensual 
relationships are underinclusive, overinclusive, or both. 
For instance, the laissez-faire approach (where there is only a sexual 
harassment policy in place) appears to be substantially underinclusive in its 
coverage.  Although such approaches may cause faculty members to 
hesitate before engaging in such relationships because of the potential 
dangers involved, relying on sexual harassment policies alone does not 
appear to directly confront all the dangers that supervisory or evaluative 
relationships pose to the university, including subtle coercion by professors 
not easily reached by the terms of sexual harassment policies, and the 
potential harm to third-party students caused by perceived favoritism.130  
On the other hand, the advisory approach (where consensual relationships 
are merely discouraged and/or forced to be disclosed) is both 
underinclusive and overinclusive.  It is underinclusive in that it does not 
provide a sufficient institutional response to those particularly harmful 
consensual relationships in which the professor has a current evaluative or 
supervisory relationship with the student, and the faculty member is 
inappropriately using the power of his or her position to favor or disfavor 
his or her lover.  The advisory approach is overinclusive in that not all 
consensual relationships should be discouraged without specific 
consideration of how the specific relationship impacts the college or 
university environment. 
Although the conflict of interest approach does differentiate properly 
between supervisory and non-supervisory consensual relationships, it is 
also both underinclusive and overinclusive in that it differentiates between 
these types of consensual relationships without recognizing that 
supervisory relationships may be permissible and non-supervisory may be 
impermissible, again depending upon the impact of the relationship upon 
the college or university.131  Lastly, the prohibitory approach is 
significantly overinclusive.  Although some feminist legal scholars argue 
130. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
131. See Greer, supra note 118, at 437 (finding “power disparity” to be “a radically 
overinclusive criterion for barring sexual relations.”). 
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that concepts such as consent have no meaning in a power relationship 
between a female student and a male faculty member,132 such views ignore 
that some consensual relationships, especially non-supervisory ones, are 
never harmful to their participants or other relevant third parties.133
A remaining approach to faculty-student consensual relationships that 
is neither underinclusive nor overinclusive is a sliding scale approach.  
Under this approach, consensual relationships are neither always permitted 
nor strictly prohibited.134  Rather, the sliding scale approach is consistent 
with the idea that there can be no bright line rules in applying the nexus 
principle.135  Instead, the focus of such a consensual relationship policy is 
on the discernible impact or effect that the specific consensual relationship 
is having on (1) the college’s or university’s reputation in the community, 
(2) the ability of the professor to effectively perform his or her job, or (3) 
the desire of other third-party students or faculty members to interact with 
the professor in question.136  Although there cannot be a bright-line rule 
concerning when a college university can properly regulate such 
relationships, certain presumptions can nevertheless be established based 
on whether the professor has current academic responsibility for the 
student.137
If the professor is currently supervising or evaluating a student with 
whom he or she is romantically involved, such consensual relationships 
presumptively impact the university in a negative manner and therefore, 
such a relationship should normally be prohibited.  This is because when a 
professor engages in a consensual relationship with a student with whom 
132. See supra note 48. 
133. Additionally, and as discussed above, such views also improperly assume that the 
exploited individual is always a female student.  See supra note 48. 
134. See Forell, supra note 2, at 52 (“I was struck by the extremity of the positions 
expressed: faculty-student sexual relationships are either always good or always bad.  
Obviously, neither extreme is true.”). 
135. See Mack, supra note 2, at 103 (“Sex between faculty and students resists any 
attempt at generalization, because individual experiences vary greatly.”); Chamallas, supra 
note 2, at 861 (arguing for a context sensitive and fact specific assessment of power 
relationships). 
136. See W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 436, 436-37 (1957) 
(Kesselman, Arb.); Inland Container Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 312, 314 (1957) 
(Ferguson, Arb.).  Concerns over real or perceived favoritism by other students would be 
covered by the third type of impact a consensual relationship could have on the academic 
setting. 
137. I am uncomfortable extending the reach of consensual relationship policies to 
prohibit relationships between faculty members and students that they are likely to teach as 
the University of California actually does.  See Trounson, supra note 1, at B1.  The better 
approach is to wait until the relationship becomes a supervisory one before treating it like 
other supervisory relationships in order not to be overinclusive. 
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the professor has a supervisory or evaluative relationship, it is difficult for 
such a relationship to truly exist in an off-campus manner.138  For one 
thing, because the student will be interacting with the professor in class or 
within some other institutional context, there would seem to be an obvious 
conflict of interest between the professor’s interests as educator versus the 
professor’s interests as lover.139  Moreover, other students would most 
likely believe that the beloved student would be benefiting from 
preferential treatment from the professor and lose confidence in the 
integrity of the academic system.140  Last, because such relationships may 
lead to a spurned lover and a vindictive sexual harassment charge being 
filed, the university may believe that such a relationship will inevitably 
lead to a high profile lawsuit, which will scar the institution’s reputation.141  
As a result, in such supervisory or evaluative instances, faculty-student 
consensual relationships will presumptively have an adverse impact on the 
educational setting and should be proscribed, unless the professor can carry 
his or her very heavy burden of showing that the relationship has no more 
than a negligible, detrimental impact on the college or university 
community. 
A potential criticism of this approach is that the sliding scale approach 
establishes a presumption that can never be overcome.  In other words, the 
sliding scale approach only makes more sense than a conflict of interest 
approach if there exist hypothetical situations in which the professor, in a 
supervisory relationship, will be able to overcome this heavy burden.142  In 
138. For instance, Professor Young argues that perceptions of favoritism are most 
likely and most harmful when there is a conflict of interest.  See Young, supra note 2, at 
280. 
139. See Heffernan, supra note 38, at 806 (“Admittedly, some instructors may not 
exhibit bias toward their lovers.  However, it is reasonable to assume that the inclination 
toward partiality is very substantial and that instructors will often act on it.”).
140. See Mack, supra note 2, at 82. 
141. Some argue, with good reason, that this is the very reason why the conflict of 
interest approach that bans all supervisory consensual relationships makes the most sense.  
In addition to the fact that these relationships are fraught with peril, there does not appear to 
be a good way to regulate these relationships before the damage is done because a sexual 
harassment complaint will not come to a university’s attention until the relationship has 
gone south.  See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.  Although I appreciate the 
concerns of university counsel in protecting his or her institution from legal liability, like 
Professor Elliott, I wonder “when constitutionally and statutorily protected liberties and 
rights became secondary to insulating educational institutions from damage suits . . . .”  
Elliott, supra note 2, at 47.  Because we must take seriously the privacy and associational 
rights of both professors and students, the door to supervisory faculty-student consensual 
relationships must remain slightly ajar for those rare instances when such supervisory 
relationships are not shown to have a detrimental impact on the university. 
142. Clearly, a professor engaged in a supervisory consensual relationship with one 
student will not be able to call other students in his or her classes to present evidence at a 
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fact, there are situations in which a professor will be able to show that his 
supervisory consensual relationship with a student has had only a 
negligible, detrimental impact on the college or university.  For instance, in 
a small classroom setting of three or four students, where all the students 
receive A’s and none of the students receive recommendations, letters of 
reference, or any other benefit from the professor, a romantic affair 
between one of the students and the professor may be possible.  Another 
instance may be where other students remain completely oblivious to the 
supervisory relationship and there is no perceived favoritism, and the 
situation must only be addressed because another faculty member or 
administrator has found out and filed a complaint (which also remains 
confidential).  In either of these situations, and depending upon other 
circumstances (including whether real favoritism exists), the faculty 
member may be able to show that his or her supervisory relationship has 
had little detrimental impact on the college or university. 
Although the instances of when such supervisory relationships are 
permissible may not be many, and most such relationships should be 
prohibited, I am nevertheless unwilling to countenance an approach to 
faculty-student consensual relationships that completely ignores the very 
real privacy and associational interests, constitutional and otherwise, that 
exist in this context.143  The importance of these rights in this fundamental 
area of human experience cannot be overstated and makes a blanket 
prohibition on supervisory relationships in the higher education setting 
inappropriate.144
On the other hand, if there is no current evaluative or supervisory 
relationship between the professor and student, such a consensual 
relationship presumptively does not impact negatively the college or 
hearing that they did not believe the professor to be biased as a result of the relationship.  
Moreover, any testimony by the involved student or professor will be self-serving. 
143. See Mack, supra note 2, at 92 (“If the potential for harm is minimal and the 
consent is informed, the university’s interest in preventing a sexual relationship may be low.  
Policy and enforcement procedures may benefit by maintaining flexibility, so an evaluation 
of harm and consent in individual cases is possible.”). 
144. Alternatively, for those uncomfortable with permitting supervisory relationships 
under any circumstances because of perceived favoritism or because of the liability risks to 
the university, a less satisfactory way of still giving due consideration to a faculty member’s 
privacy or associational interests is by making the professor’s evidentiary showing in these 
hearings go solely to the penalty the institution may impose.  In other words, the college or 
university can still sanction the professor for the supervisory relationship with his or her 
student, but reduce the severity of the sanction from discharge to a suspension or warning if 
the professor is able to show a minimal impact on the college or university environment as a 
result of the consensual relationship. 
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university.145  Accordingly, the burden, which may or may not be difficult 
to overcome, should be on the postsecondary institution to prove such a 
detrimental impact before disciplinary action can be taken against the 
professor.  Then again, colleges and universities should not just ignore, or 
only discourage, consensual relationships merely because the professor has 
no academic responsibility for the student in question.146  If the non-
supervisory relationship has a discernible and detrimental impact on the 
college or university environment, the professor should be subject to 
discipline, as he or she has just as much interfered with the learning 
atmosphere as the professor who has engaged in a normal supervisory 
consensual relationship.  Thus, under the sliding scale approach, a 
professor in a non-supervisory consensual relationship with a student still 
undertakes a considerable professional risk in commencing such a 
relationship and must think twice before doing so.   
All told, this sliding scale approach to faculty-student consensual 
relationships respects the overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, 
interests of the faculty member, student, university, and third parties, and 
provides a workable framework under which such faculty-student 
relationships can be consistently and uniformly analyzed.  Because the 
sliding scale approach has its basis in the well-established nexus principle 
of labor arbitration law, an added advantage is that college and university 
administrators not only can be confident that such an approach will yield 
fair and equitable results, but also that there will be an available source of 
case law to consult when their universities face these complicated 
scenarios.   
CONCLUSION 
As faculty-student sexual liaisons continue to intrigue some and 
irritate others, universities and colleges remain faced with the daunting 
problem of how to appropriately regulate these relationships in order to 
minimize their impact on the college or university community, while 
simultaneously respecting the privacy and associational interests of those 
involved.  Relying on over a half-century of labor arbitration law, this 
article asserts that colleges and universities should adopt a sliding scale 
approach, based on the nexus principle, to faculty-student consensual 
relationships.  The sliding scale approach to faculty-student consensual 
145. See Young, supra note 2, at 288 (“Where the professor is not responsible for 
evaluating the student, however, the ‘coercion’ argument becomes quite weak.”). 
146. Professor Forell seems to also argue for such an approach to non-supervisory 
consensual relationships.  See Forell, supra note 2, at 68-69.   
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relationships properly limits a college or university’s regulation of 
consensual relationships to those instances in which a discernible and 
detrimental effect on the academic environment has been demonstrated, 
rather than centering regulation on highly indeterminate, and politically 
charged, concepts such as consent and power.   
